World Happiness Report 2023 81 The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the two key dimensions of state effectiveness – peace and security and high state capacities – in greater detail. Then we discuss the underlying processes that promote state effectiveness. We pull this analysis together in the section after that. In the final section, we develop the implications for well-being, and also make an empirical connection with the results that were presented in Chapter 2. Elements of State Effectiveness We begin by discussing the two core dimensions of state effectiveness introduced above: the ability to establish peace and to build state capacities. Peace and social order: The Weber doctrine One core function of an effective state is to limit the use of violence and maintain law and order. Since Max Weber first enunciated the idea,3 it is widely accepted that a key feature of an effective state is to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force in the territory over which it has jurisdiction. Of course, what constitutes “legitimate” in this context is not obvious. But it is generally accepted that this term refers to a state where the citizens accept such coercion and trust the state to use its power to coerce in a responsible manner. It is not enough for the state to coerce by depriving their citizens of basic political rights in the name of establishing order, although this remains extremely common. The Weberian approach unambiguously rules out political violence by non-state actors, as occurs during civil wars where citizens from different groups use violent means to compete for power. It is useful to begin with an empirical overview.4 Civil wars remain today: standard data sources suggest that 22 countries out of 170 had at least one year of civil war during the period 2006-16. Such wars are more common in poorer countries with 13 of the 22 being low income, 7 middle income, and only 2 high income.5 Low income can be both a cause and a consequence of such violence. But political conditions matter as well. A standard measure of such conditions, discussed in more detail below, is whether executive power is subject to legislative and judicial constraints. According to a standard measure of strong executive constraints,6 20 out of the 22 countries with a civil war in 2006-16 never had strong executive constraints over this period. The frequency of civil wars peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, and the proportion of countries with internal conflict has been steadily declining thereafter. The prevalence of civil war has now leveled out at around 10 percent.7 A country not having an outright civil war does not imply that political violence is absent. It may just reflect that the incumbent regime uses its monopoly on violence to repress any political opposition. Such a state may appear to be effective in a Weberian sense, but violence here is “one-sided” as rulers lock up opposition groups and stamp out protests. Historically, coercive repression was the main method for sustaining political power, rather than winning elections. But it remains prevalent today with 76 countries experiencing state repression in at least one year between 2006-16. While the share of countries engaging in repression fell from 30-40 percent in the 1950s to near zero by the late 1990s/early 2000s, it has been on an upward trend since 2006, with almost 10 percent of countries carrying out some form of political purges. This is linked to a democratic recession over this period, with the populations of Brazil, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela all seeing higher repression.8 There are thus good reasons to think about repression and civil war as two sides of the same coin – i.e., as substitutes. Indeed, over the post-war period, repression has generally declined while civil war has been on the rise. Moreover, repression generally occurs in a higher portion of the world income distribution than does civil war. Of the 76 countries with repression in 2006-16, 37 were low income, 26 were middle income, and 9 were high income. Moreover, 53 did not have strong executive constraints in this period. The presence of political violence has important implications for investment in education as well as for the kinds of private investment needed to create jobs and prosperity. Civil conflict has negative consequences for income, as it typically
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